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CALIFORNIA'S LEMON LAW - DEVELOPMENTS UNDER
THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT
by Nancy Barron*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty-three percent of new
cars require an extensive repair
within one year of purchase and
more than fourteen percent experi-
ence multiple problems.' In 1987,
manufacturers recalled more than
eight million cars and light trucks
for safety-related defects alone 2
Far too often, however, manufac-
turers and dealers either ignore
consumer complaints or fail to
remedy the substantial automobile
defects.
State lemon laws provide the
primary protection for purchasers
of new3 motor vehicles. Currently,
forty-six states have lemon laws. 4
In addition, purchasers of new
automobiles are protected by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act ("Magnuson-Moss
Act") 5 and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("U.C.C."). 6 California's
lemon law, the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act ("Song-Bev-
erly Act" or "the Act"),7 is similar
to lemon laws in many states.8 The
Act gives purchasers rights they
did not have at common law. In
essence, the Act mandates that an
automobile manufacturer repair
substantial defects that cause a
vehicle not to conform to the man-
ufacturer's express warranties. If
after a reasonable number of at-
tempts the manufacturer is unable
to repair the vehicle, the consumer
is entitled to a replacement or a
refund. If the manufacturer fails to
replace or refund, the manufactur-
er may be liable to the consumer
far beyond the value of a replace-
ment vehicle or a refund of the
purchase price. Damages available
under the Act include out-of-
pocket costs, incidental and conse-
quential damages, litigation costs,
attorneys fees and a civil penalty,
in addition to a refund or replace-
ment of the vehicle.9
This Article examines Califor-
nia's Song-Beverly Act, recent
amendments to the Act, and case
law that has developed under the
Act. This Article is intended to
educate consumers and consumer
law practitioners by discussing key
issues that frequently arise in pre-
paring a lemon law case. Although
the focus is on the California Song-
Beverly Act, the issues discussed
herein are equally applicable in the
context of similar lemon laws in
other states. This Article also high-
lights the contrasting aspects of the
Song-Beverly Act, the U.C.C., and
the Magnuson-Moss Act. This
analysis should assist practitioners
to determine whether in a given
situation claims should be brought
under more than one of the stat-
utes. 0
"State lemon laws provide the
primary protection for
purchasers of new motor
vehicles."
Section 1I of this article address-
es the elements of a lemon law
claim: what constitutes a "consum-
er good," what is a "nonconformi-
ty," when has a manufacturer had
a reasonable opportunity to repair,
and what is the effect of the con-
sumer's continued use of the defec-
tive vehicle. Next, section III de-
scribes the potential recovery for
consumers, including attorneys
fees and a civil penalty for a manu-
facturer's willful failure to comply
with the Act.
II. ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
UNDER THE SONG-BEVERLY
CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT
A. What are consumer goods?
The Song-Beverly Act, the
U.C.C., and the federal Magnuson-
Moss Act require the plaintiff to
establish that the vehicle is a "con-
sumer good." The tests differ sig-
nificantly, however, under the
three statutes. The Song-Beverly
Act and the U.C.C. define a con-
sumer good as "any new product or
part thereof that is used, bought, or
leased for use primarily for person-
al, family, or household purpos-
es."'' This is a subjective test that
focuses on how the consumer actu-
ally used the product, rather than
the product's common use. In con-
trast, the Magnuson-Moss Act de-
fines a consumer product as "any
tangible personal property which is
distributed in commerce and
which is normally used for person-
al, family, or household purpos-
es."" This is an objective test that
focuses on the common use of the
product.13
Because the two tests differ, a
consumer may be protected by one
statute but not the other. For ex-
ample, in Crume v. Ford Motor
Company, 14 the buyers of a flatbed
truck brought a Magnuson-Moss
Act claim. The court, applying the
objective "normal use" test, held
that evidence of how the buyer
actually used the truck was irrele-
vant to whether a vehicle qualifies
as a "consumer product" for pur-
poses of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
Because the plaintiff failed to pre-
sent evidence of how flatbed trucks
commonly are used, the court di-
rected a verdict for Ford Motor
Company. This case might have
been decided differently under the
Song-Beverly Act if the evidence
presented established that the buy-
er used the flatbed truck primarily
for household purposes.
Consumers typically will have
little difficulty establishing that
they actually used the vehicle pri-
marily for personal or household
purposes. If the vehicle is used
primarily or exclusively for busi-
ness purposes, however, it may not
be protected by the Song-Beverly
Act or the U.C.C., but may be
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protected under the Magnuson-
Moss Act if the vehicle commonly
is used for personal or household
purposes.' 5 Automobiles are con-
sidered "consumer products" un-
der the Magnuson-Moss Act,' 6 but
the same is not true for all motor
vehicles."
B. What is a nonconformity?
The Song-Beverly Act requires
that the manufacturer or its dealers
"conform the vehicle to the express
warranties."' 8 The Act's protec-
tions apply only if the alleged
"nonconformity" both breaches
the express warranties and sub-
stantially impairs the vehicle's use,
value, or safety.' 9
1. Express Warranties
The Song-Beverly Act defines
"express warranty" 20 as:
(1) A written statement...
pursuant to which the manu-
facturer, distributor, or retail-
er undertakes to preserve or
maintain the utility or perfor-
mance of the consumer good
or provide compensation if
there is a failure in utility or
performance; or
(2) In the event of any
sample or model, that the
whole of the goods conforms
to such sample or model.2
Unlike under the U.C.C.,22 the
plaintiff need not prove that the
written statement was a factor in
the purchase decision.2 3 However,
unlike "express warranties" as de-
fined under the U.C.C.,24 the Song-
Beverly Act does not apply to oral
warranties.25
2. Substantial Impairment
Not all defects that violate ex-
press warranties trigger Song-Bev-
erly Act protections. The noncon-
formity also must "substantially
impair the use, value or safety of
the new motor vehicle to the buy-
er."' 26 A substantial impairment of
any one of the statutory trio of
factors - use, value, or safety -
technically is sufficient to support
a Song-Beverly Act claim.
In order to promote the Act's
remedial purpose, 27 state and fed-
eral courts should broadly inter-
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pret "nonconformity" and "sub-
stantial impairment." A narrow
interpretation would make illusory
manufacturers' express written
warranties by allowing manufac-
turers to dismiss the bulk of cus-
tomer complaints as "insubstan-
tial" or "insignificant." In Chmill
v. Friendly Ford-Mercury,28 the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals broad-
ly interpreted the term "substan-
tial impairment" and held that a
buyer does not have to show that
the vehicle was inoperable or val-
ueless. In Chmill, the buyers of a
Ford Tempo brought a Wisconsin
lemon law claim against the manu-
facturer and dealer for a noncon-
formity described as a discernible
"pull" to the left. As of the final
day of trial, the plaintiffs had driv-
en the car 78,000 miles despite the
pulling problem. Citing cases de-
cided under the U.C.C., Ford ar-
gued that a car driven for 78,000
"[The Song-Beverly] Act
mandates that an automobile
manufacturer repair
substantial defects that cause
a vehicle not to conform to the
manufacturer's express
warranties."
miles, as a matter of law, could not
be substantially impaired. In re-
jecting Ford's argument, the court
noted that the U.C.C. focused sole-
ly on whether there was a sub-
stantial impairment of value, 2 9
whereas the Wisconsin lemon law
looked to whether there was a
substantial impairment of use, val-
ue, or safety.3 0 The court conclud-
ed that a vehicle does not satisfy
the use, value, or safety standard
merely by "serv[ing] its primary
purpose of providing 'simple trans-
portation.' "3' Although a defect
that substantially impairs a vehi-
cle's use or safety in most cases also
would substantially impair its val-
ue, this is not necessarily the case.
Because "nonconformity" is de-
fined more broadly under the
Song-Beverly Act than under the
commercial code, the consumer
always should plead his claim un-
der both the Act and the U.C.C.
The Act applies a subjective test
in looking to whether the vehicle
was substantially impaired "to the
buyer."32 In each case, the plaintiff
should produce clear evidence of
the personal effect of the car's
problems. For example, the pur-
chaser's use of the vehicle may be
hindered by unreliability. Perhaps
the defect is merely a leaking
hatch-back, but this may prevent
the purchaser from carrying gro-
ceries, laundry, etc., because it
frequently rains where the consum-
er lives. Usually, a long repair
history itself can impair the value
of the car because it is more diffi-
cult to obtain a competitive sale
price for a car that has been the
subject of extensive repairs. 33
Finally, if a safety problem is
alleged, plaintiffs should empha-
size their justifiable fears for their
well-being. Safety problems such as
stalling, hesitation on acceleration,
and loss of power on the freeway
are common problems in today's
electronically controlled cars. In
the case of Ibrahim v. Ford Motor
Company, the appellate court not-
ed:
After a harrowing experience
when the Cougar died while
passing over railroad tracks,
plaintiff decided she had had
enough .... Because she was
pregnant and convinced that
the Cougar was unsafe to
drive, plaintiff in July used
all of her savings to buy an-
other vehicle. 34
In California, where use of vid-
eotapes in the courtroom is com-
mon, plaintiffs' counsel have had
considerable success in personaliz-
ing their cases through videotaped
episodes featuring the defective
vehicles.
Many different problems in new
motor vehicles have been found to
be "nonconformities" under lem-
on laws similar to the Song-Beverly
Act. These range from such obvi-
ous safety defects as faulty steering
to intangible problems like an an-
noying "shimmy" 35 and even a
defective paint job. 36 The consum-
er should consider introducing ex-
pert testimony as to the cause of
the alleged nonconformity and the
long-term effect of that defect on
the safety, use, and value of the
(continued on page 98)
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vehicle. For example, a common
complaint is abnormal engine
noise. The repair dealership may
claim its technician could not iden-
tify the source of the problem, and
so no repair was done. Further, the
dealership may claim the noise is a
normal condition of the particular
make and model and therefore not
a "nonconformity." In fact, engine
noise may well be a symptom of an
engine problem and may foreshad-
ow premature engine failure after
expiration of the warranty. Simi-
larly, a "pulling" condition or
seemingly minor alignment prob-
lem in fact may be evidence of a
bent frame or other transit damage
to the vehicle before it was sold as
new. An expert often is essential to
prove that these conditions are
substantial nonconformities.
C. What is a reasonable opportunity
to repair?
The Song-Beverly Act provides
that if the vehicle does not con-
form to the express warranties, the
manufacturer must begin repairs
"within a reasonable time" 37 and
repair the vehicle "so as to con-
form to the applicable warran-
ties." 38 If the manufacturer cannot
repair the vehicle
to conform to the applicable
express warranties after a rea-
sonable number of attempts,
the manufacturer shall either
promptly replace the new
motor vehicle ... or promptly
make restitution to the buy-
er.
39
The buyer has the option of choos-
ing either a replacement or a re-
fund. 40
Before the Act defined "reason-
able number of attempts," manu-
facturers were able to deny con-
sumers relief indefinitely. Buyers
were forced to take their cars in
repeatedly for repairs, even as
many as thirty times.41 Effective
1983, however, the Act was
amended to define "reasonable
number of attempts." 42 The manu-
facturer is presumed to have had a
"reasonable number of attempts"
to conform the vehicle to the ex-
press warranties if, within one year
from delivery to the buyer or
12,000 miles of use, whichever
occurs first, either (1) the same
nonconformity has been subject to
repairfour or more times, or (2) the
vehicle is out of service for a
cumulative total of more than 30
calendar days.43
The buyer must notify the man-
ufacturer of the nonconforming
defects by returning the vehicle for
repair or by providing written no-
tice if returning the vehicle is im-
possible.44 However, the buyer on-
ly must provide such notice if the
manufacturer clearly and conspic-
uously disclosed the buyer's rights
and responsibilities under the Act,
including the buyer's responsibility
of providing notice of the noncon-
formities.45
Once the consumer proves that
the vehicle was subject to four
repair attempts or was out of ser-
vice for a total of thirty days, the
burden then shifts to the defendant
to prove that it was not allowed a
"The Song-Beverly Act
requires that the
manufacturer or its dealers
'conform the vehicle to the
express warranties.'"
reasonable number of attempts to
repair the automobile. 46 Because
the definition of a "reasonable
number of attempts" is only a
presumption, this leaves open the
possibility that the plaintiff may
prove that less than four repair
attempts or thirty days out of ser-
vice constitutes a reasonable num-
ber of attempts. 47
The thirty-day limit 4 may be
extended if the failure to repair the
nonconformity results from condi-
tions beyond the manufacturer's
control. 49 Although the Act does
not define "conditions beyond the
control of the manufacturer," oth-
er state lemon laws and courts have
limited the conditions to natural
disasters.50 The defendant's inabil-
ity to identify or repair the noncon-
formity does not qualify as a cir-
cumstance beyond the control of
the manufacturer. 51 For example,
in Chmill, the court rejected such
an argument, reasoning that "[i]f
an acknowledged defect cannot be
diagnosed... no matter how many
times the consumer presents the
vehicle for repair, the consumer is
without recourse. '52 In fact, the
Chmill court held that merely pre-
senting the car to the dealer consti-
tutes a "repair attempt," even if
the dealer cannot identify the de-
fect and therefore does not actually
attempt to repair the car.53 In so
holding, the Chmill court recog-
nized that dealers might try to
thwart the statutory requirements
by claiming that they could not
identify or repair the defect.
Moreover, the plaintiff probably
does not have to identify the
source of the problem. Under the
Magnuson-Moss Act, "[i]t is suffi-
cient if . . . the evidence shows,
either directly or by permissible
inference, that the goods were de-
fective in their performance or
function or that they otherwise
failed to conform to the warran-
ty. ' 5 4 The consumer need only
"offer credible evidence that the
defect is materials or workmanship
related."55 The California courts
have not determined the specifici-
ty with which the plaintiff must
identify the defect, although a bur-
den of proof similar to that re-
quired under the Magnuson-Moss
Act should apply to Song-Beverly
Act suits. Clearly, consumers are
less able than manufacturers to
identify the source of a defect.
Moreover, manufacturers may, in-
tentionally or unintentionally,
tamper with the evidence while
attempting to repair the vehicle or
after the consumer has returned
the vehicle.
D. Continued use and set-off
1. Continued Use Does Not De-
feat "Lemon Law" Rights
Prior to the enactment of the
Song-Beverly Act, the issue of con-
tinued use of a consumer product
was governed by the law of waiv-
er.56 According to this common
law doctrine, the right to rescind
acceptance of a consumer product
may be waived if the consumer,
having full knowledge of the cir-
cumstances warranting rescission,
nonetheless accepted and retained
the benefits of the contract. 57 The
U.C.C., as interpreted by most
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courts, to some extent modified
the doctrine of waiver by providing
that reasonable continued use of an
automobile does not, as a matter of
law, prevent the buyer from re-
scinding acceptance of the prod-
uct.5 Similarly, under the Song-
Beverly Act continued use does
not, as a matter of law, bar rescis-
sion.5 9
By allowing the consumer to
continue using the vehicle without
losing her right to revoke accep-
tance of the vehicle, courts and
legislatures recognize the unequal
bargaining power between the con-
sumer and the manufacturer. Fre-
quently, the consumer is depen-
dent upon having a car and
financially unable to secure alter-
native means of transportation. 60
A contrary rule would enable man-
ufacturers to benefit from their
wrongdoing: manufacturers would
have an incentive to ignore con-
sumer claims, forcing consumers
to drive defective cars at a risk to
the general safety. Then, if the
consumer brought a lemon law
suit, the manufacturer might be
able to assert the consumer's con-
tinued use as a defense to the
otherwise valid claim. 61 Moreover,
continued use should not preclude
revocation of acceptance because
the consumer's continued use may
not indicate that the consumer has
"accepted" the vehicle. This is
particularly true when the noncon-
formity affects only value and thus
the consumer is not prevented
from continued use by a safety
threat or an effectively unusable
vehicle.
2. Set-Off for Use of the Vehicle
The Act provides that if the
manufacturer fails to repair the
product to conform to the express
warranties, the manufacturer must
"either replace the goods or reim-
burse the buyer in an amount equal
to the purchase price paid by the
buyer, less that amount directly
attributable to use by the buyer
prior to discovery of the noncon-
formity." 62 Notably, the Act pro-
vides no set-off for the consumer's
use of the vehicle after the noncon-
formity is discovered. This reflects
the diminished value to the con-
sumer of a defective vehicle.
The Act establishes the follow-
ing formula for calculating the set-
off for use prior to the first repair
attempt:63
vehicle price x pre-repair miles
120,000
For example, suppose the buyer
paid $23,652, before financing,
and the vehicle had been driven
1,559 miles when the consumer
first brought the vehicle in for
repairs. The set-off would be:
23,652 x 1,559 = $307.28
120,000
The consumer's reimbursement
is reduced by the amount of the
set-off or, in the case of a replace-
ment, the consumer must pay the
amount of the set-off to the manu-
facturer.64 Allowing a set-off in
cases of replacement may cause
problems when the consumer can-
not afford to pay the amount of the
set-off to the manufacturer. There-
fore, unlike California, many
states' lemon laws do not provide
for a set-off in cases of replace-
ment. 6
5
"The nonconformity.., must
'substantiallyimpair[ ] the
use, value or safetyof the
new motor vehicle to the
buyer."
III. DAMAGES AVAILABLE UNDER
THE SONG-BEVERLY ACT
A. Actual damages
The Song-Beverly Act incorpo-
rates portions of the California
Commercial Code in its remedies
section. 66 The Act seeks to fully
compensate the aggrieved consum-
er by providing, when applicable,
out-of-pocket, incidental, and con-
sequential damages, as well as civil
penalties, litigation expenses, and
attorney's fees. 67
1. Out-of-Pocket Loss
The Song-Beverly Act entitles
plaintiffs to recover actual dam-
ages. 68 Thus, a plaintiff may re-
cover all losses resulting in the
ordinary course of events, as deter-
mined in any manner that is rea-
sonable. 69 A plaintiff's most direct
loss due to a defective vehicle lies
in the purchase-related expenses.
Purchase-related expenses include
the purchase price, license and
documentary fees, sales tax, and
finance charges.70
2. Incidental and Consequential
Damages
In addition to actual damages,
the Song-Beverly Act provides that
consumers may recover reasonable
incidental and consequential dam-
ages.7 Typically, incidental dam-
ages include any reasonable ex-
penses incident to the failure to
provide a product free from de-
fects. 72 Under the Act, the buyer
has the right to compensation for
money and time spent in effort to
make the vehicle conform to the
warranties, such as repair costs,
towing charges, rental car expens-
es, and some insurance. 73 The buy-
er also is entitled to loss of use
damages, which may be measured
by the number of days the vehicle
is in for repairs multiplied by the
reasonable rental value of the vehi-
cle.7 4
Consequential damages include
any loss suffered by plaintiffs re-
sulting from their special needs of
which the seller had reason to
know. 75 This may include damages
for inconvenience, aggravation,
mental distress, discomfort, anxi-
ety, depression, and pain and suf-
fering resulting from seller's
breach.7 6 In Jacobs v. Rosemount
Winnebago South, the Minnesota
Supreme Court soundly reasoned
that buyers need to have confi-
dence that the vehicles they rely on
for transportation are safe and
dependable.77 When the plaintiff's
vehicle failed to satisfy this basic
need, the plaintiff was able to
recover not only actual and inci-
dental damages, but also conse-
quential damages for the loss of
enjoyment.78
Alternatively, an aggrieved con-
sumer may seek redress for emo-
tional distress under a tort theory.
Violating a statutory duty often
constitutes the tort of negligence at
common law.7 9 In California, a
plaintiff may recover if the negli-
gence causes emotional distress
that is severe and satisfies certain
guarantees of genuineness, 0 al-
though the emotional distress need
not be physically manifested.8 ' The
(continued on page 100)
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plaintiff, however, must plead and
prove every element of both the
tort theory and the Song-Beverly
Act claim.
B. The Civil Penalty
1. The "Willfulness" Require-
ment
In 1982, the Song-Beverly Act
was amended to include a civil
penalty provision in addition to
actual, incidental, and consequen-
tial damages. Section 1794(a) of
the Act provides that if "the failure
to comply was willful, the judg-
ment may include . . . a civil
penalty which shall not exceed two
times the amount of actual dam-
ages."8 2
In Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Com-
pany, the California Court of Ap-
peals clarified the meaning of
"willfulness:" 8 3
The statutory concept of will-
fulness does not include the
moral component ... associat-
ed with the oppression, fraud,
or malice required ... for the
recovery of punitive dam-
ages.... It amounts to nothing
more than this: That the per-
son knows what he is doing
[and] intends to do what he is
doing.8 4
The Ibrahim court noted that
the consumer need not prove that
the manufacturer intended to in-
jure or take advantage of the con-
sumer, or violate the law. 5 In-
stead, the consumer need only
show that the manufacturer in-
tended the acts or omissions.
2. Effect of a Qualified Manufac-
turer's Arbitration Program
The 1987 amendments to the
Song-Beverly Act encourage manu-
facturers to offer to consumers
independent third-party arbitra-
tion programs. 86 Although for
years most manufacturers have of-
fered some form of industry-spon-
sored arbitration program, these
programs were far from "indepen-
dent" and caused widespread con-
sumer dissatisfaction. The 1987
amendments were designed to in-
crease the accountability and inde-
pendence of manufacturers' arbi-
tration programs. Among other
requirements, a manufacturer's ar-
bitration program must meet Fed-
eral Trade Commission require-
ments8" and be certified by the
California State Department of
Consumer Affairs in order to qual-
ify under the Act.88 Only a handful
of arbitration programs have quali-
fied for certification. 89
If a manufacturer has a qualified
arbitration program and notifies
the consumer of the program and
how to use it, a consumer who has
not resorted to the program cannot
invoke the "reasonable number of
attempts to repair" presumption in
court.90 If the consumer does par-
ticipate in the arbitration program,
the findings of the arbitrator are
admissible in any subsequent suit 9'
and the consumer only may obtain
a civil penalty in a subsequent
lawsuit by showing that the manu-
facturer's violation of the Act was
willful.92 If the manufacturer's ar-
bitration program is not qualified
"The Act seeks to fully
compensate the aggrieved
consumer by providing, when
applicable, out-of-pocket,
incidental, and consequential
damages, as well as civil
penalties, litigation expenses,
and attorney's fees."
under the Act, or if the manufac-
turer failed to properly notify the
consumer of the arbitration pro-
gram, the consumer is not obligat-
ed to participate in the arbitration
program and does not have to
prove willfulness to recover a civil
penalty in a lawsuit.93
3. Election Between the Civil
Penalty and Punitive Damages
When an automobile defect re-
sults in personal injury, the injured
party may have concurrent causes
of action under a tort theory and
the Song-Beverly Act. 94 The tort
theory supports an award of puni-
tive damages if the defendant's
actions were made knowingly and
were reprehensible. 95 The Act pro-
vides that a consumer may recover
a civil penalty for the manufactur-
er's violation. Theoretically, the
consumer should be able to recover
both the civil penalty and punitive
damages.
The court in Troensgaard v. Sil-
vercrest Industries96 viewed the is-
sue as one of double recovery. The
consumer complained to the man-
ufacturer about a problem with her
mobilehome. After the manufac-
turer inspected the mobilehome, it
concealed the nature of the defect
and refused to fix the problem. The
consumer then brought a strict
liability claim based on the manu-
facturer's concealment of the de-
fect and a Song-Beverly Act claim
based on the manufacturer's fail-
ure to remedy a defect. The jury
awarded her $90,000 in compensa-
tory damages, $55,000 in punitive
damages, and $90,000 as a statuto-
ry civil penalty. In modifying the
award, the court held that the
consumer could not recover both
the civil penalty and punitive dam-
ages. The court reasoned that the
punitive damages and the civil
penalty arose out of the same set of
operative facts and the manufac-
turer should not be punished twice
for "substantially the same con-
duct." 97 Thus, "by seeking a 'civil
penalty'... [the consumer] had in
effect elected to waive punitive
damages." 9
The same result is not necessari-
ly true in all cases when the plain-
tiff pursues both a tort claim and a
Song-Beverly Act claim. For exam-
ple, a plaintiff might assert both
that the manufacturer committed
fraud in connection with the sale
by representing as "new" a pre-
owned or previously damaged ve-
hicle and that the manufacturer
failed to repair the vehicle to com-
ply with the express warranties.
The facts supporting the fraud
claim (that the vehicle was pre-
owned or previously damaged)
would not be "substantially the
same conduct" as the facts sup-
porting the Song-Beverly Act claim
(the manufacturer's subsequent re-
fusal to honor the express warran-
ties).
C. Attorneys' fees are mandatory to
a prevailing plaintiff
The Song-Beverly Act mandates
an award of costs and attorneys
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fees to the prevailing plaintiff.99 If
the plaintiff prevails in the lemon
law claim, the plaintiff "shall be
allowed by the court to recover as
part of the judgment a sum equal to
the aggregate amount of costs and
expenses, including attorney's fees
... ,,100 The fees must be "reason-
ably incurred" and based upon
actual time expended.' 0 ' However,
the judge has broad discretion to
determine the extent that the fees
were "reasonably" incurred. 02
In consumer litigation, there is
always the likelihood that attor-
neys' fees based on actual time
attorneys fees expended will ex-
ceed the damages award. After all,
the consumer generally will be su-
ing a large manufacturer for a
relatively small amount of money,
unless the consumer sues to recov-
er for personal injuries or the suit is
brought as a class action. 0 3 Corpo-
rate defendants are well aware of
ways to increase legal fees by dis-
covery battles and other means. A
California Main County Superior
Court Judge recently commented
wryly in open court that Ford
Motor Company has a papermill
going, with "automatons" running
it. 0 4 A rule that limited the
amount of recoverable attorneys
fees to the amount of actual dam-
ages would result in stonewalling
by manufacturers. 05
In enacting a similar attorneys
fees provision in the Magnuson-
Moss Act, Congress anticipated
corporate defense tactics that force
consumer counsel to expend con-
siderable time and money on war-
ranty cases, resulting in attorneys
fees in excess of damages awarded.
As Senator Magnuson noted,
an attorney's fee . . . based
upon actual time expended
rather than being tied to any
percentage of the recovery...
make[s] the pursuit of con-
sumer rights involving inex-
pensive consumer products
economically feasible. 0 6
Therefore, plaintiffs can recover
"reasonable" attorneys fees even
in excess of the amount of direct,
incidental, and consequential
damages recovered.
IV. CONCLUSION
California's Song-Beverly Act,
like most states' lemon laws, pro-
vides to new car buyers protection
far beyond warranty remedies at
common law. In order to avail
themselves of these protections,
consumers must be familiar with
their rights and the procedures for
obtaining relief. If consumers are
prepared to assert their statutory
rights and prove their cases, lemon
laws can go a long way toward
giving full relief to aggrieved con-
sumers and pressuring the manu-
facturers to honor their warranties.
The Song-Beverly Act protects
most consumers who purchase new
cars that are defective. To trigger
the Act's protections, the defect
must be substantial and must vio-
late the manufacturer's express
written warranties. If the defect
violates an oral warranty, the con-
sumer may have to join a U.C.C. or
Magnuson-Moss Act claim in or-
der to obtain relief.
If a consumer complains of a
substantial defect that violates the
"By knowing the law and
preparing to enforce their
rights, consumers can ensure
they get the vehicle the
manufacturer promised and
not a 'lemon.' "
manufacturer's express warranties,
the manufacturer is allowed a "rea-
sonable number of attempts" to fix
the defect. Under recent case law,
California courts will presume the
manufacturer had a reasonable
number of attempts if the defect is
not fixed in four attempts or if the
vehicle is out of service for a
cumulative total of thirty or more
days. As the Wisconsin courts have
interpreted their lemon law, pre-
senting the vehicle for repair con-
stitutes a repair attempt, whether
or not the manufacturer attempts
to fix the defect or can even identi-
fy the problem. This rule properly
puts the onus on the manufacturer
to discover and remedy the defect,
rather than sticking the consumer
with an irremediable "lemon." In
order to prove that the manufac-
turer had a reasonable number of
attempts, the consumer should
thoroughly document the vehicle's
repair history.
The manufacturer is entitled to
a set-off for the consumer's use of
the vehicle before the first repair
attempt. However, the manufac-
turer is not entitled to a set-off for
the consumer's use of the vehicle
between repair attempts, nor does
that use necessarily defeat the lem-
on law claim. This provision in the
lemon law recognizes that consum-
ers may have no alternative than to
drive a defective vehicle, and that a
defect may be substantial although
not totally debilitative.
Lemon laws seek to fully com-
pensate aggrieved consumers, and
make valid lemon law claims via-
ble, by providing for actual, inci-
dental, and consequential dam-
ages, as well as mandatory
attorneys fees for the prevailing
consumer. Moreover, the Califor-
nia lemon law provides a civil
penalty to encourage manufactur-
ers to promptly address consum-
ers' complaints. If a manufacturer
has an arbitration program that
qualifies under the Act, the con-
sumer must prove that the manu-
facturer's failure to comply with
the Act was willful in order to
recover a civil penalty. In addition,
if the manufacturer's arbitration
program qualifies under the Act,
the consumer must resort to the
program before taking advantage
of the "reasonable number of at-
tempts" presumption in court. If a
manufacturer's arbitration pro-
gram does not qualify under the
Act, the consumer need not prove
that the violation was willful.
The California lemon law and
recent decisions interpreting the
lemon law have given new car
purchasers significant rights. By
knowing the law and preparing to
enforce their rights, consumers can
ensure they get the vehicle the
manufacturer promised and not a
"lemon."
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